UNION-EMPLOYER AGREEMENTS AND THE ANTITRUST
LAWS: THE PENNINGTON AND JEWEL TEA CASES
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the

several States, or with foreign nations" is illegal.' Section 2 of the same
act proscribes monopolization, attempts to monopolize and agreements to
monopolize interstate or foreign commerce.2 Other statutes accord labor
organizations special status under the antitrust laws. Section 6 of the
Clayton Act provides:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor . . . organizations . . . or to forbid or restrain individual members of

such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof,
be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.3
Section 20 of the Clayton Act and sections 1 and 13 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act in effect exempt union-employer agreements relating to
"terms or conditions of employment." 4 The scope of the exemption in the
context of union-employer agreements depends on what are the "legitimate
objects" of unions and what are "terms or conditions of employment." 15
The phrase "terms or conditions of employment" appears in another
context. Under sections 8(d), 8(a) (5) and 8(b) (3) of the Taft-Hartley
Act,6 union and employer have a duty to bargain in good faith with each
other about "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."
In many cases, then, the Taft-Hartley Act compels union-employer bargaining.' The question raised is whether the similarity of language in the
1

26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).

226 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §2 (1964).

338 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §17 (1964).

4 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964) ; 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101
(1964) ; 47 Stat 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1964). In United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), the Supreme Court held that where the Clayton and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts would bar an injunction, a Sherman Act criminal prosecution
is likewise barred. Thus the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts together create
an exemption for labor unions from the Sherman Act.
5See generally Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis,
104 U. PA. L. REV. 252 (1955); Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and
the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. Cxr. L. REV. 659 (1965).
661 Stat 141, 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), 158(a)(5), 158(b)(3) (1964).
In Fibre'7 The scope of the so-called "mandatory" bargaining subjects is wide.
board Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), for example, the Supreme
Court held that the employer was under a duty to bargain with a maintenance em-
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statutes means that Congress intended to exempt from the antitrust laws
only those union-employer agreements which deal with subjects about which
employer and union have a duty to bargain in good faith, or whether the
exemption is broader or narrower than that duty.

I.

ALLEN BRADLEY AND PROGENY

In a 1945 case, Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers,8 a New York local of the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers had entered into closed shop agreements with electrical
equipment manufacturers and electrical contractors, all in the New York
City area. The contractors agreed to buy only from local manufacturers
which had closed shop agreements with the union; the manufacturers agreed
to confine their New York City sales to contractors employing members
of the union. "In the course of time, this type of individual employeremployee agreement expanded into industry-wide understandings, looking
not merely to terms and conditions of employment but also to price and
market control." 9 The results were more jobs, higher wages and shorter
hours for members of the local. Prices of electrical equipment in New
ployees' union with respect to its decision to contract out the maintenance work done
by those employees. In Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362
U.S. 330 (1960), the Court held that the railroad had a duty to bargain about its
decision to eliminate certain railroad stations, where elimination of each station would
do away with the job of an employee who belonged to the union. The majority in
R.R. Telegraphers said:
We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the union's effort to
negotiate about the job security of its members "represents an attempt to
usurp legitimate managerial prerogative in the exercise of business judgment
with respect to the most economical and efficient conduct of its operations."
Id. at 336. (Footnote omitted.) The question becomes, what does the concept of
"job security" include? Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas and Harlan,
concurring in Fibreboard, criticized the majority opinion for its implicit suggestions
that the mandatory "conditions of employment" include "any subject which is insisted
upon as a prerequisite for continued employment" 379 U.S. at 221.
[T]here are passages in the Court's opinion today which suggest just such
an expansive interpretation, for the Court's opinion seems to imply that any
issue which may reasonably divide an employer and his employees must be
the subject of compulsory collective bargaining.
Ibid. Positing an expansive reading of "terms or conditions of employment" in
§ 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, it is apparent that union-employer collective bargaining agreements may operate more as a restraint on trade as the subjects of those
agreements grow more remote from the basic terms of employment, wages and hours.
8325 U.S. 797 (1945).
See generally Bernhardt, The Allen Bradley Doctrine:
An Accommodation of Conflicting Policies, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1094 (1962).
9 325 U.S. at 799-800. The trier of fact had found that the union participated in a
"code committee" which passed on the terms of every bid made by contractors for
work in New York City.
In figuring bids on such work, the members were required by the rules
to add 35% to the labor cost for "overhead", and 10% to the cost of material
as "commission" and to "load" the bid with at least 6% for management cost
If any bidder made a low bid which figured 10% or more below the average
of the bids submitted, his bid was subject to investigation to determine in
what particulars he was engaged in price-cutting. Price-cutting was penalized
by substantial fines.
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 41 F. Supp. 727,
732 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (report of special master).
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York City were disproportionately high, as were the profits of local contractors and manufacturers. The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment
against the union under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The theory of the
Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Black, was that the union had aided
and abetted an employer conspiracy aimed at eliminating competitors.
[W]hen the unions participated with a combination of business
men who had complete power to eliminate all competition among
themselves and to prevent all competition from others, a situation
was created not included within the exemptions of the Clayton
and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. 10
In dictum, Mr. Justice Black affirmed an earlier statement by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Hutcheson11 that
so long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups the licit and the illicit under § 20 [of the
Clayton Act] are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the
selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular
2
union activities are the means.
Mr. Justice Black conceded in Allen Bradley that "our holding means that
the same labor union activities may or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether the union acts alone or in combination
with business groups." "8 Mr. justice Roberts, concurring in Allen Bradley, pointed out that the union had been the active party, the instigator
rather than merely an "aider and abettor." 14 He argued that agreements
between one union and one employer should be subject to antitrust liability
where appropriate. 15 Mr. Justice Murphy dissented because the union had
acted in its "self-interest." Why, he asked, should activity lawful if done
alone become unlawful if done with the same purpose, but with the assistance of others?"1
Allen Bradley's vague standard of "combining" with non-labor groups
raised many questions. When else would a multi-employer collective bargaining agreement be held to violate the antitrust laws? Why should
agreements between a union and single employer be exempt? Since the
electrical union was itself the leading force in the conspiracy, the "aider and
abettor" epithet apparently was of little importance.
10 325 U.S. at 809.

11312 U.S. 219 (1941).
12 Id. at 232; see 325 U.S. at 810-11.
13 Id. at 810.
14 Id. at 814.
15 Id. at 818.
's Id. at 820-21.
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Is union purpose relevant or even determinative in deciding whether
there has been a violation? If union purpose to restrain trade is a consideration, must the sole purpose be to restrain trade? The primary purpose? Or just a substantial purpose?
Do only agreements framed in terms of direct market restraintsprice fixing, product limitation or market allocation-constitute violations?
Was price fixing or exclusion of out of state products, or both, or each, the
vice in Allen Bradley? Or do all multi-employer agreements constitute
violations when the detrimental effect on competition is substantial? Did
the Allen Bradley holding constitute a retreat from the Court's position in
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader? 17 In that case the Supreme Court held that
an organizational sit-down strike of a nonunion factory to force the employer to sign a closed shop agreement did not violate section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Only eight of the employer's 2,500 employees were members
of the union. Much of the plant's equipment was damaged. Mr. Justice
Stone, writing for the majority, said:
Since, in order to render a labor combination effective it must
eliminate the competition from nonunion made goods . . . an

elimination of price competition based on differences in labor
standards is the objective of any national labor organization. But
this effect on competition has not been considered to be the kind
of curtailment of price competition prohibited by the Sherman
Act.18
The Court entered this area again in 1954, when on the same day it
decided United States v. Employing PlasterersAss'n -1 and United States
v. Employing Lathers Ass'n.20 In Employing Plasterersthe Court reversed
the dismissal of a complaint which alleged that a Chicago trade association
of plastering contractors, a local plasterers' union and the union's president
acted in concert to suppress competition among local plastering
contractors, to prevent out-of-state contractors from doing any
business in the Chicago area and to bar entry of new local contractors without approval by a private examining board set up by
the union. The effect of all this has been an unlawful and unreasonable restraint of the flow in interstate commerce of materials
2
used in the Chicago plastering industry. '
17 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
'SId. at 503-04. An alternate ground for decision was that there had not been
an actual or intended restraint on market competition, hence there could be no substantive Sherman Act violation even absent the labor exemption. Indeed, the bulk

of the opinion was devoted to this ground. See id. at 486-502, 505-13.
19347 U.S. 186 (1954).
20 347

U.S. 198 (1954).

21347 U.S. at 188.
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The complaint was founded on section 1 of the Sherman Act. = The Court
also reversed dismissal of the complaint in Employing Lathers, where a
similar kind of combination was alleged to have
achieved almost complete mastery over the lathing business in the
Chicago area. It limits the number of lathing contractors, prescribes their qualifications, decides who meets the standards prescribed, excludes persons from the business on varied grounds,
including arbitrary racial standards, and assigns plastering con23
tractors to each lathing contractor.
Although at several points Mr. Justice Minton, dissenting, said that
there had been no purpose to restrain interstate commerce, his emphasis
was on the word 'interstate." It is not clear what importance he gave to
union purpose. From the majority's statement of the allegations in each
case it arguably could have ignored union purpose. In Employing Plasterers Mr. Justice Black for the majority summarily dismissed the union's
claim of immunity from prosecution because of section 20 of the Clayton
Act by saying that "the allegations .

.

. show, if true, that the union

and its president have combined with business contractors to suppress
competition among them.

Allen Bradley .

.

.

."2-

Arguably,

the

allegation of combination "to suppress competition" calls for proof of union
purpose to suppress competition.
Thus, many questions raised by Allen Bradley have remained in limbo
until the Supreme Court's recent decisions in two civil cases brought against
unions by employers who were themselves party to collective bargaining
contracts with the defendants. Although the Court struggled to formulate
guidelines, it is again doubtful whether, on the whole, clarity or uncertainty
has been the product.2 6
II.

JEWEL

TEA

In Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 2 7 the local

unions had obtained covenants in collective bargaining agreements with
virtually all the supermarkets and independent meat dealers in the Chicago
area that no meat store or meat department would remain open past six p.m.
221d. at 187 n-*.
23347
2

U.S. at 199-200.

347 U.S. at 190, 195.

25 Id.at 190.
26 This Comment will analyze the scope of a rule announced in one of the cases,
pp. 911-14 infra, some problems in its philosophy and application, pp. 914-25 infra,
and the dissenting view of Mr. Justice Goldberg, pp. 925-30 infra, and will suggest
an approach which may harmonize the concerns of a majority of the Court, pp.
931-37 infra. Finally, it will suggest that the unique facts of the case may justify
new legislation, pp. 937-38 infra.
27 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
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Bargaining had been with a multi-employer bargaining unit composed of
about 9,000 food retailers. The employers came to terms with the union
after Jewel Tea and another employer, National Tea Company, had dropped
out of the bargaining unit. Jewel Tea thereafter agreed to the union demand in the face of a union strike vote. It later brought suit in a federal
district court against the unions and an association of about 1,000 individual
and independent (as contrasted with chain) food stores, "Associated Food
Retailers," which had been part of the multi-employer bargaining unit.
The company sought an injunction and damages, alleging a conspiracy to
restrain trade among retail meat markets in the Chicago area by limiting
the marketing hours for meat.
In a trial without a jury the district judge ruled 2 that there was no
violation of the Sherman Act because (1) there was no evidence tying in
Associated and its officers as conspirators-indeed, there was evidence
of arm's length bargaining; (2) the marketing hours restriction was a
proper labor goal, within the labor exemption from the Sherman Act, because (a) there was a long collective bargaining history of union interest
in marketing hours, (b) the union introduced evidence that self-service
meat markets cannot operate at night without employees on duty to rearrange and replenish the stock in the counter and to give personal attention
to customers and (c) the union properly was concerned about increased
work during the day because of night operations; (3) there was no evidence of a destructive effect on competition within the Chicago area; and
(4) "the fact that some consumers would prefer longer than 54 hours during the week within which to buy fresh meat can hardly constitute the
basis for holding a restriction on night hours to be an unreasonable restraint of trade." 2
The court of appeals reversed,3 0 holding that "the evidence . . .
supports the allegations of the complaint charging that the unions and
.. [Associated] effectuated through a contract, an unreasonable restraint of trade." 31 The court found that the provision as to marketing
hours was not within the labor exemption because such a consideration
was "one of the proprietary functions." 32
2
8Jewel Tea Co. v. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 215 F. Supp. 839
(N.D. Ill. 1963). In an earlier disposition, the trial judge dismissed the complaint
against Associated. Jewel Tea Co. v. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 215
F. Supp. 837 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
29 215 F. Supp. at 849.
30 Jewel Tea Co. v. Associated Food Retailers, 331 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1964).
31 Id. at 550.
32
Id.at 549.
The hours of the day when his business is to be open to accommodate the
demands of customers, in the judgment of the owner of the business, is not
a condition of employment, contrary to the district court's finding. As long
as all rights of employees are recognized and duly observed by the employer,
including the number of hours per day that any one shall be required to
work, any agreement by a labor union, acting in concert with business competitors of the employer, designed to interfere with his operation of a retail
business, engaged in handling products in the course of interstate commerce,
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The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in a six to three
decision. The majority held that the marketing hour restriction was
"within the realm of 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment' about which employers and unions must bargain." 3 3 Mr.
Justice White, writing for Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan, characterized the dispute as "a narrow factual question: Are night operations without butchers, and without infringement of butchers' interests,
feasible? The District Court resolved this factual dispute in favor of the
unions." 34 Mr. Justice White saw the Court's function as "limited to
reviewing the record to satisfy ourselves that the trial judge's findings are
not clearly erroneous. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 52(a)." - 5 In deciding that
the lower court's findings were not clearly erroneous, he pointed to the
evidence of the long history of union opposition to night work by seeking
marketing hour restrictions, the unions' evidence as to the impracticality
of night operations without butchers and the fact that during the 1957
negotiations proposals by employers for relaxation of the operating hours
restriction were accompanied by provisions for flexible work days that
would permit night work. Mr. Justice White focused solely on whether
the unions acted within their exemption; he did not consider whether the
unions' activity would have constituted a violation of the Sherman Act
had there been no exemption.
Concurring in the judgment, Mr. Justice Goldberg, writing an opinion
joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, characterized the case as involving
"conventional collective bargaining on wages, hours, and working conditions-mandatory subjects of bargaining" under the labor laws. 30 He
carried the notion of legitimate interest further than did Mr. Justice White,
saying that even if the unions intended to protect the independent food
37
markets they were pursuing a legitimate purpose.
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Clark, dissented on
the ground that proof of a conspiracy had been made out:
[I]n the circumstances of this case the collective agreement itself,
of which the District Court said there was clear proof, was eviis a violation of the Sherman Act, and not entitled to the exemption therefrom claimed by the defendant unions in this case.

Ibid. Defendants' argument that Jewel Tea had no standing to sue because it had
itself signed a contract with a marketing hour restriction, and therefore was in pari
delicto with the defendants, was rejected because
the in pari delicto defense does not apply where plaintiff's participation in
the wrong alleged was induced by economic necessity, or where plaintiff's
wrongful act is divorced from the illegal conspiracy, agreement or combination alleged in the complaint.

Id. at 550-51 (quoting from prior decision affirming lower court refusal to dismiss
complaint, 274 F.2d 217, 223 (7th Cir. 1960)).
381 U.S. at 691.
4Id. at 694.
85 Ibid.
86 Id. at 700.
37 Id. at 727-28.
33

3
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dence of a conspiracy among the employers with the unions to
impose the marketing hours restriction on Jewel via a strike threat
by the unions.38
Unless Allen Bradley is either overruled or greatly impaired, the
unions can no more aid a group of businessmen to force their competitors to follow uniform store marketing hours than to force
them to sell at fixed prices. Both practices take away the freedom
of traders to carry on their business in their own competitive
fashion. 39
III. UMW v. PENNINGTON
In UMW v. Pennington,-0 trustees of the United Mine Workers welfare fund brought suit against Phillips Brothers Coal Company, a small
mining partnership, for 55,000 dollars in royalty payments due under the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement which Phillips had signed.
Phillips filed a cross claim against the UMW and a counterclaim against
the trustees of the welfare fund, alleging that the UMW and the trustees
had conspired with several large mine operators in violation of sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act. A jury verdict against the trustees was set
aside by the trial judge, who entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial judge's finding of insufficient evidence to support the verdict.4 1 A jury verdict against the UMW for 90,000
dollars was trebled by the trial judge, whose finding of substantial evidence
2
to support the verdict was affirmed by the court of appeals.4 The aspect of
the case dealing with the trustees of the welfare fund did not come before
the Supreme Court, but the judgment against the UMW was unanimously
reversed by the Court, and the case was remanded for a new trial.
The allegations against the UMW were that it had agreed with the
large mine operators to control overproduction in the industry by helping
to eliminate the small mines. The union's part was to help finance the
mechanization of the larger mines and to impose a uniform wage agreement
on all operators without regard for their ability to pay. The union members were to receive higher wages as the large mines gained control of the
market and produced more coal through mechanization.
Mr. Justice White, writing for the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Brennan in an opinion designated as the Court's, based reversal on the trial
court's improper admission of evidence of union attempts to influence public
officials. The trial court's theory had been that such evidence would show
illegal activity if part of a general scheme to eliminate small mine operators.
38 Id. at 736.
89 Id. at 737.
40 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
4
1 Pennington v. UMW, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963).
42 Ibid.
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Mr. Justice White held that the rule of Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,Inc.43 immunized attempts to influence public
officials irrespective of any anticompetitive purpose which might be present.
Before reaching this conclusion, however, he held that the trial court had
not erred in denying the UMW's motion for a directed verdict and for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The union's theory had been that
in the circumstances presented it was clearly exempt from the antitrust
laws. 44 Mr. Justice White held that the motions were properly denied
because "if as is alleged in this case, the union became a party to a collusive bidding arrangement designed to drive Phillips and others from the
TVA spot market, we think any claim to exemption from antitrust liability
would be frivolous at best." 45 He went on to say in dictum that although
a union may bargain with a multi-employer group and may try to get the
same terms from other employers,
a union forfeits its exemption from the antitrust laws when it is
clearly shown that it has agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units. One group
of employers may not conspire to eliminate competitors from the
industry and the union is liable with the employers if it becomes
a party to the conspiracy. This is true even though the union's
part in the scheme is an undertaking to secure the same wages,
hours or other conditions of employment from the remaining
employers in the industry. 46
From the labor law standpoint, Mr. Justice White reasoned, the national
labor policy of permitting unions to obtain uniform labor standards does
not mean that "the union and the employers in one bargaining unit are
free to bargain about the wages, hours and working conditions of other
bargaining units or to attempt to settle these matters for the entire industry." 47 Furthermore, the antitrust law policy is "clearly set against
employer-union agreements seeking to prescribe labor standards outside the
bargaining unit." 48 The primary justification for this conclusion was that
the union thereby "surrenders its freedom of action with respect to its
bargaining policy," and "it is just such restraints upon the freedom of economic units to act according to their own choice and discretion that run
counter to antitrust policy." 49
43 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
44 It had also contended in support of its motion for judgment notwithstanding

the verdict that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict The trial
judge rejected this contention. Record, vol. 1, p. 90a, UMW v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657 (1965). The court of appeals affirmed. Pennington v. UMW, 325 F.?d

804, 810-16 (6th Cir. 1963).

45 UMW v. Pennington,

Id. at 665-66.
47 Id. at 666.
48Id. at 668.
49 Ibid.
46

381 U.S. 657, 663 (1965).
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A concurring opinion was written by Mr. Justice Douglas, in which
Justices Black and Clark joined. He interpreted the opinion "of the
Court" as calling for jury instructions that (1) an industry-wide collective
bargaining agreement in which union and employers agree on a wage scale
too high for some employers, made for the purpose of forcing some employers out of business, violates the antitrust laws and (2) "an industrywide agreement containing those features is prima facie evidence of a
violation." 50

Mr. Justice Goldberg, with Justices Harlan and Stewart joining, concurred in the result but dissented from the opinion. He first stressed that,
contrary to the theory of Phillips that the UMW had participated in an
employer conspiracy to drive the small mine owners out of business, the
union had adopted "a philosophy of achieving uniform high wages, fringe
benefits, and good working conditions" in return for accepting the "burdens and consequences of automation." 51 He further stated that Pennington, as Jewel Tea, involved "conventional collective bargaining on
wages, hours, and working conditions-mandatory subjects of bargaining
,,52 He maintained:
under the National Labor Relations Act ....
To hold that mandatory collective bargaining is completely protected would effectuate the congressional policies of encouraging
free collective bargaining, subject only to specific restrictions contained in the labor laws, and of limiting judicial- intervention in
labor matters via the antitrust route-an intervention which necessarily under the Sherman Act places on judges and juries the
determination of "what public policy in regard to the industrial
struggle demands." 53
The rule propounded by the Court, he said, makes a meaningless, formalistic distinction, in that "it states that uniform wage agreements may be
made with multi-employer units but an agreement cannot be made to affect
employers outside the formal bargaining unit." 54 Finally, Mr. Justice
Goldberg asserted that the Court must have ignored section 6 of the Clayton Act, which provides that "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce," - and the rule of Apex that "the antitrust
laws do not prohibit the 'elimination of price competition based on differences in labor standards.'" 56 An agreement to seek uniform wages in an
57
industry restrains only competition in employee wage standards.
5 0 Id. at 672-73.
51 Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 698

(1965).
52

Id. at 700.
. d. at 710, quoting in part from Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254
U.S. 443, 485 (1921) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis).
54381 U.S. at 722.

55 Id. at 723.
56Ibid.
07 lbid.
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IV.

AGREEMENTS To IMPOSE TERMS ON OTHER EMPLOYERS

While only two other Justices joined Mr. Justice White's opinion in
Pennington, a majority of the Court may subscribe to his dictum that a
union acts outside its immunity to the antitrust laws when it agrees to
impose a certain wage scale on other employers. 58 The outer limits of this
rule, a new development in antitrust law, were not made explicit by Mr.
Justice White. It therefore becomes important to discuss what scope the
rule may assume in future cases.
A. Per Se Violation?
Possibly Mr. Justice White did not intend to imply that agreements
to impose terms on other employers are per se violations of the antitrust
laws, but meant instead that the rule of reason governs, and that such
agreements may be justified in the appropriate case. Support for this view
might be found in his framing the rule in terms of forfeiting the labor exemption rather than in terms of violating the antitrust laws. His approach
in Pennington, however, contrasts with that taken in Jewel Tea. In the
latter case he also spoke in terms of the labor exemption, and held that the
justified use of a marketing hour restriction to control the hours of work
brought the Meat Cutters within the labor exemption. But he then went
on to say in a footnote that were the restriction not so justified the reasonableness of the restraint would be at issue.5 Any such suggestion of a
possible reasonable justification in terms of "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment" 60 is lacking in Pennington. Furthermore,
it is difficult to reconcile the view that he did not intend such agreements
to be per se violations with his statement that the undesirability of such
agreements from the standpoint of antitrust policy is not dependent upon
their purpose or effect:
From the viewpoint of antitrust policy, moreover, all such
agreements between a group of employers and a union that the
union will seek specified labor standards outside the bargaining
unit suffer from a more basic defect, without regard to predatory
intention or effect in the particular case. For the salient characteristic of such agreements is that the union surrenders its freedom of action with respect to its bargaining policy. 6'
58

Mr. Justice Douglas began his concurring opinion in Pennington by saying,
two

"As we read the opinion of the Court," 381 U.S. at 672, implying that he and the

justices he spoke for had no essential disagreement with the majority opinion. Furthermore, Mr. Justice Douglas would more readily find an antitrust violation than would
Mr. Justice White, see pp. 922-25 infra, so it is fair to infer that he and the justices
who joined his opinion would go at least as far as supporting the Pennington'dictum.
59 Id. at 693 n.6.
60 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
6
1UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 668 (1965).
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The sense that these agreements are violative per se also comes through
in the sentences immediately following Mr. Justice White's statement of
the forfeiture rule:
One group of employers may not conspire to eliminate competitors from the industry and the union is liable with the employers
if it becomes a party to the conspiracy. This is true even though
the union's part in the scheme is an undertaking to secure the
same wages, hours or other conditions of employment from the
remaining employers in the industry.62
These factors make it more probable than not that Mr. Justice White's
treatment of the issues in Pennington solely in terms of the union exemption actually indicates that a union's agreement to impose terms of employment on other employers is a per se violation of the antitrust laws.
B. "Most Favored Nation" Clauses

Mr. Justice White spoke in terms of agreements "to impose," but
presumably he would include in his rule agreements whereby the union
agrees to use its "best efforts" to impose conditions on other employers,
because the effect would be the same. Instead of a covenant to impose, or
attempt to impose, similar standards on other employers, the union might
agree to a "most favored nation" clause, whereby the union promises not
to extend more favorable terms to another employer unless the contracting
employer gets the benefits of those terms. Mr. Justice White's opinion
casts some doubt upon the legality of such a clause. 63
Although an agreement to impose terms and a most favored nation
clause are essentially the same thing, that is, an assurance to the contracting
employer that other employers will not be placed in a more advantageous
competitive position by virtue of having to give up less to the union, there
is a difference. Mr. Justice White's concern about the union's relinquishing
control over its collective bargaining policy is not operative in the case of
the most favored nation clause to the same degree as in the case of agreements to impose terms, since in the former case the union has no obligation
to the employer to seek similar terms from other employers. For this
reason, it might be argued that a union which is operating under a most
favored nation clause will not be as inflexible in its demands on other employers as one which is party to an agreement to impose terms. However,
the union's decision on whether to back off from its original demand will
be affected by the necessity of giving similarly favorable terms to the original employer or employers because of the most favored nation clause.
62Id. at

665-66.

The prohibition of most favored nation clauses, and related clauses such as
agreements to impose terms on other employers, was advocated in Winter, Collective
Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 71 (1963).
63
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Thus a powerful union would probably be as inflexible in its subsequent
bargaining policy under a most favored nation clause as under the other
proscribed types of employer guarantees or assurances. Hence, it seems
reasonable to conclude that Mr. Justice White would hold that most
favored nation clauses come within his rule.
C. Allen Bradley Dictum Overruled?
Although Mr. Justice White spoke of agreements between a group of
employers and a union to impose terms on other employers, there appears
to be no rational distinction, in terms of the considerations which he thought
important, between multi-employer agreements and agreements with single
employers. In each case labor standards are imposed on employers outside
the bargaining unit. In each case "the union surrenders its freedom of
action with respect to its bargaining policy." 6 Mr. Justice White's treatment of the contested clause in Jewel Tea is consistent with the view that
the antitrust laws apply to single employer agreements. In that case he
said there was no issue as to the existence of a union-employer conspiracy
against Jewel Tea, and that the only question was whether the Jewel Tea
agreement itself was immune from the antitrust laws. 65 He did say that
"it might be argued that absent any union-employer conspiracy against
Jewel and absent any agreement between Jewel and any other employer,
the Union-Jewel contract cannot be a violation of the Sherman Act." 66
But unless he thought there was a real possibility that such an agreement
might violate the Sherman Act, his treatment at length 67 of whether the
agreement was immune from antitrust law was a gesture of extraordinary
futility.
It thus appears that a majority of the Court would find no rational
ground for maldng the same distinction that was made in the Allen Bradley
dictum that "the same labor union activities may or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether the union acts alone or
in combination with business groups." 68
Mr. Justice Black, who concurred with Mr. Justice Douglas in Pennington, wrote the majority opinion in Allen Bradley. Mr. Justice Douglas
was a part of that majority. Their concurrence in Mr. Justice White's
opinion in Pennington may be an indication that the Allen Bradley dictum
was not a well considered one. On the other hand, it is entirely possible
that these Justices did not think Mr. Justice White's approach necessarily
conflicted with it.
04UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 668 (1965).
65

(1965).

Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 688

66 Ibid.

67 See

id. at 688-97.

68 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S.
797, 810 (1945). (Emphasis added.)
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It is possible that the Allen Bradley opinion seemed to the Justices
to require an employer conspiracy before there could be an antitrust violation by a union, on the assumption that a single employer's agreement
could not by itself "unreasonably" restrain trade. Mr. Justice White in
Jewel Tea apparently did not share that assumption, however, because he
carefully pointed out that an agreement between the union and Jewel Tea
on meat prices would not be exempt, "whatever substantive questions of
violation there might be." 0 If the contract is not exempt from the antitrust laws, why might there not be an unlawful restraint of trade? If the
price fixing agreement were not held per se violative, what justification
could the union offer for its "reasonableness" in fixing the employer's
price? 7 0 What justification could a union offer for agreeing to use whatever means it could to drive an employer's competitors out of business? 71
V.

"AGREEMENT": SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Mr. Justice White said, in Pennington:
Unilaterally, and without agreement with any employer group
to do so, a union may adopt a uniform wage policy and seek vigorously to implement it even though it may suspect that some
employers cannot effectively compete if they are required to pay
the wage scale demanded by the union. The union need not gear
its wage demands to wages which the weakest units in the industry
can afford to pay. Such union conduct is not alone sufficient evidence to maintain a union-employer conspiracy charge under the
Sherman Act. There must be additional direct or indirect evidence of the conspiracy. There was, of course, other evidence in
72
this case, but we indicate no opinion as to its sufficiency.
The question which Mr. Justice White did not answer is how a judge or
a jury is to distinguish unilateral union action to impose a uniform wage
scale on all employers from action pursuant to an agreement with some
employers. A review of the evidence in the Pennington case illustrates the
difficulty of distinguishing these two factual situations, a difficulty which
was heightened by the lack of clarity in the judge's charge to the jury.
A. The Evidence
Phillips' evidence against the union was directed toward showing that
there was a change in the pattern of collective bargaining in 1950, whereby
69 381 U.S. at 689.
70 The hypothetical situation of a price fixing agreement with a single employer
is probably unrealistic for, even assuming that the employer had a monopoly or was
an oligopolistic price leader and could unilaterally raise its prices at the expense of
consumers, the union could get all that its members would want merely by demanding
a higher wage. The effect on consumers, of course, would probably be the same.
71 This situation would be realistic where the union had organized only one employer or could provide job replacements for those members who lost jobs because
of its activities.
72UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 n2 (1965).
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the union gave up its attempt to control the working time of its members,
and in return the large mine operators agreed to a union shop clause 73
and a welfare fund clause. 74 Wage increases 75 and increases in payments
required to be made to the welfare fund 76 were allegedly "carefully designed and tailored to meet the abilities of these major coal companies to
pay the increases by reason of their intervening mechanization since the
last increase." 77

The "only purpose" of the union in imposing the uniform national
collective bargaining agreement on the small mine operators, Phillips contended, was to force the small mines out of business. 78 Several clauses in
the uniform agreement were allegedly directed against the small employers.
A "land-lease" clause, 79 instituted in 1943, provided that the collective
bargaining agreement applied to coal land leased out by signatory companies, cutting off from nonunion operators a source of mining locations.
A 1958 clause, the "protective wage" clause,80 prevented signatory mine
operators from buying coal (usually for fulfilling requirements under longterm contracts) from mines which maintained conditions of employment
below union scale.
Phillips cited instances of joint action by the union and large coal
operators, the effect of which was to harm small operators. Several large
companies joined the union in its successful campaign to get the Secretary
of Labor to determine a high minimum prevailing wage rate for the bituminous coal industry,81 under the Walsh-Healey Act.82 A union representative attended a meeting held by representatives of the large mines with
Tennessee Valley Authority officials, at which the mine owners argued
that the TVA should curtail its purchases on the "spot market" and buy
more of its coal requirements by term contract.8 The spot market consisted of coal purchases under contracts of less than six months' duration,84
a substantial portion of which were exempt from the Walsh-Healey Act
and its minimum wage requirement. 85
73

Record, vol. 2, p. 998a, UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).

74 Id. at vols. 2, 3, pp. 998a-1002a.
75 Id. at vol. 1, p. 400a.

Ibid.
Id. at vol. 1, p. 114a.
78 Id. at vol. 2, p. 960a. There was no evidence of a written agreement between
the union and the large mine operators to impose the uniform national bargaining
agreement on the small operators. Phillips introduced evidence of union violence and
harassment to force small mine operators, including Phillips, to sign the national
agreement even though the union did not represent a majority of their employees.
Id. at vol. 1, pp. 119a-95a, vol. 2, pp. 964a-84a.
79
Id. at vol. 3, p. 108a.
80
1d. at 1109a.
81 Id. at vol. 1, pp. 456a-60a.
8249 Stat. 2036 (1936), 41 U.S.C. §§35-45 (1964).
83
Record, vol. 2, pp. 781a-83a, UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
84See id. at 807a-08a, 824a.
85 UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 660-61 (1965).
7
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The evidence further showed that the union had acquired a substantial
interest in a major coal company, West Kentucky Coal Company. The
union owned outright about ten percent of the outstanding common stock 8 6
and all of the preferred stock.8 7 A total of more than fifteen million dollars
in loans by the union to various individuals and corporations was secured by
stock in West Kentucky and its subsidiary Nashville Coal Company.8
Under the terms of the loans the debt could be extinguished by surrender
of the stock to the union, even though the market value may have dropped.8 9
There was no provision for interest, although in some cases the union got
one-half the dividends,90 and in another case the union got all the dividends.' 1 There was no demand for additional collateral when the stock
did drop in value.9 2 One large loan secured by West Kentucky stock had
been made to Cyrus S. Eaton, chairman of the boards of directors of West
Kentucky and Nashville.9 3 Other evidence of union involvement was that
a five million dollar bank loan to West Kentucky was secured by unionowned United States Treasury Bonds.9 4
Phillips' theory was that the union had used its effective control over
the two coal companies to guide their selling policies and use them as
"fighting ships" to dump coal on the TVA spot market at depressing
prices. 95 West Kentucky had reneged on a large twenty-year contract with
Tampa Electric Company, arguing that the contract was invalid as violative
of the antitrust laws. 96 The Supreme Court had rejected that argument
in another case. 7 Phillips contended that the objective behind reneging
98
on the contract was to use the coal to flood the TVA spot market.
As part of the union's defense, John L. Lewis testified that it was
union policy to seek uniform wages 9 9 and not to resist mechanization. 00
The higher wages were said to have been justified by the higher coal pro86 Value: $2,354,522. Record, vol. 1, p. 500a, vol. 2, p. 591a, UMW v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657 (1965).
8
7 Value: $2,500,000. Id. at vol. 1, p. 500a, vol. 2, p. 591a.
S8 Id. at 499a-500a. The union's outright ownership of 85,400 common shares of
West Kentucky and security interest in 395,000 shares probably gave it control over
a majority
of the 857,264 outstanding common shares.
89
Id. at 488a-89a, vol. 2, p. 553a.
90 Id. at vol. 3, p. 1125a.
91 Id. at vol. 2, p. 644a.
92 Id. at 570a-71a.
93 Id. at vol. 1, p. 499a, vol. 2, p. 557a.
9
4 Id. at vol. 1, p. 501a. Evidence of other union investments showed union involvement in companies which bought coal, id. at vol. 2, p. 579a. Aside from the loan to
West Kentucky, a $1,500,000 union-secured loan to a coal land holding company was
cited as an example of the union's use of its economic power to allow coal lands to
be tied up by favored companies, to the detriment of small operators. Id. at 648a-49a.
95 Id. at 609a-lla.
96 Id. at 913a.
7
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
9
8 Record, vol. 2, p. 723a, UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
99 Id. at vol. 3, p. 1142a.
100 Id. at vol. 1, p. 475a, vol. 3, pp. l130a-37a.
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duction per worker.1 0' The protective wage clause was described as necessary to prevent operators from fulfilling contracts with coal mined under
substandard conditions, thus diverting work from the employees of signatory companies. 0 2 The land-lease clause was said to have been necessary
in order to stop operators from signing a union agreement, then leasing
or subcontracting a mine or a section of a mine to a nonunion operator
who paid substandard wages. 0 3 The union shop clause, it was argued, was
ineffective, 10 4 because it explicitly provided that it was applicable only
when lawful, 0 5 and Tennessee law prohibited such clauses.' 0 6
In measuring its damages Phillips had compared only the sale price of
its "utility" coal (sold on the TVA spot market) with the national average
sale price for all coal, and had excluded the average sale price of its "premium" (higher quality) coal.' 07 Comparisons between coal of the type
mined by Phillips with coal mined throughout the country may fairly be
characterized as inconclusive.'0 8 The union introduced evidence which
tended to show that the average price of all coal sold by Phillips from 1955
through 1958 was above the national average.'0 9
A vice president of West Kentucky testified that the company sold
in the TVA spot market only when it could not sell elsewhere, 110 and that
it had lowered its prices in the spot market only after bidding unsuccessfully at higher amounts."1L
Negotiations for the National Bituminous Wage Agreement of 1950,
during which the conspiracy allegedly was formed, were shown to have
been made under pressure of federal court injunctions. One was granted
on suit by the National Labor Relations Board pending its adjudication of
an unfair labor practice complaint against the union. It enjoined the union
from insisting that any agreement contain a closed shop clause not in compliance with statutory requirements, a provision for a welfare fund for the
101 See id. at vol. 3, pp. 1135a-37a, vol. 4, p. 1724a.
0 2
Id. at vol. 3, pp. 1109a-lla, 1205a-06a.
'0 3 Id. at 1108a-09a, 1201a.
0 4
' Id. at vol. 1, pp. 195a-96a.
10 5 Id. at vol. 2, p. 998a.
'061d. at vol. 1, p. 195a.
10 Id. at 207a-08a.
108 Strip-mined coal (the type produced by Phillips) was shown to have brought
a lower price on a national average than other types of coal, because of factors of
quality and reliability of supply. Id. at vol. 3, pp. 1347a-48a, 1357a. On the other
hand, Phillips introduced evidence which tended to show that its coal was superior in
quality to the national average. Id. at 1284a, 1515a.
109 Phillips' coal price averaged forty-five cents a ton above the national average
in 1955, eighty-five cents a ton above in 1956, twenty-six cents below in 1957 and
eight cents
below in 1958. Id. at vol. 4, p. 1733a.
0
1" Id. at vol. 3, p. 1402a.
1I Id. at 1395a-1406a. Out of twenty-eight bids on the spot market by West
Kentucky, only six were successful. Id. at vol. 4, p. 1730a. John L. Lewis testified
that the union was interested in West Kentucky primarily as an investment and as a
means of providing employment for union members. Id. at vol. 3, pp. 1124a-26a. He
said the union did not use its power as a shareholder to coerce management into
signing a union contract and did not influence the company's pricing policies. Id.
at 1127a-28a.
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benefit of union members only, an "able and willing" clause or a "memorial
period" clause. 112 The other injunction, granted on suit by the United
States Attorney General under the emergency provisions of the Taft-Hartley
Act,113 ordered the union and mine operators to "engage in free collective
bargaining in good faith for the purpose of resolving their disputes and
. . . [to] make every effort to adjust and settle their differences .... ," 114
Other union evidence pointed to the failure of Phillips to honor the
wage scale of the collective bargaining agreement. One of the Phillips
partners testified:

Q. And whatever you decided to pay an individual was what
you and he decided? A. That's right.
Q. And so whatever money you made or lost was based upon
this labor agreement that you had with the men and not by reason
of the wage scale set forth in the union agreement, is that correct?
A. How's that now?
Q. So whatever you made or lost during this four and a half
year period took into account the wages that you and your men
agreed upon and not the wage scale set forth in the union contract.
A. That's right. 115
The Phillips partner also testified that he had filed reports with the union
understating tonnage of coal produced at the mine,116 thus lowering the
amount of welfare royalties.
The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950,11.7 which
was in effect during the years of alleged union misconduct (1954-1958),
did not include a clause whereby the union agreed to seek similar terms
of employment from other employers. The Appalachian Coal Union Agree-

"112Id.at 1476a-78a; Penello v. UMW, 88 F. Supp. 935 (D.D.C. 1950). The
"able and willing" clause provided:
It is the intent and purpose of the parties hereto that this agreement . . .
shall cover the employment of persons employed in the bituminous coal mines
covered by this Agreement during such time as such persons are able and
willing to work.
Id. at 939. (Italicized in original.) The "memorial period" clause provided: "The
International Union, United Mine Workers of America may designate memorial
periods provided it shall give proper notice to each district." Ibid. The court said:
The reason for insistence upon the provisions in question (to all intents and
purposes openly stated by respondent Lewis) is to control production, and
ultimately, through such control, at least indirectly, to fix prices.
Id. at 940. The court concluded that insistence on inclusion-of the "able and willing"
and "memorial period" clauses was a refusal to bargain in good faith because such
inclusion would contravene § 8(d) of Taft-Hartley, which provides for continuation
of the collective bargaining agreement for sixty days following notice of termination,
and because agreement on such clauses might have violated the antitrust laws.
113 61 stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1964).
114 United States v. UMW, 89 F. Supp. 187, 195 (D.D.C. 1950) ; Record, vol. 3,
p. 1478a, UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
115 Record, vol. 1, p. 213a, UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
110 Ibid. The trustees of the welfare fund recovered $43,424.22 in royalty payments
from Phillips in this case. Pennington v. UMW, 325 F.2d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 1963).
117 CCH LAB. L. REP 59914, at 85583-96 (1964).
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ment, signed in 1941, and the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement
of 1945 did contain most favored nation clauses." 8 These clauses were
expressly rescinded by the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of
1947.119
B. The Charge
In his charge to the jury, the trial judge paraphrased the Hutcheson
test:
The Court charges you that if the wage and welfare payment provisions in these contracts were arrived at by the parties as a result
of collective bargaining, the coal companies on their behalf and in
their self-interest, and the United Mine Workers on behalf of its
members and in their own self-interest, there is no violation of the
Sherman Act in the establishment of the wage rates and welfare
provisions through the contract, provided there was no agreement between the Union and coal operators to fix high wage
rates and royalty payments in order to drive the small coal opera20
tors out of business.'
It was not a violation for the union to insist on the "same wage and benefit
provisions in all of its collective bargaining agreements with small, medium
and large companies alike." 121 The union's substantial investment in a
coal producing company was not a violation, even if made for the purpose
of having the company "recognize and bargain with the union and pay the
union scale of wages and fringe benefits." m The protective wage and
land-lease clauses were lawful, according to the trial judge, provided the
union's insistence on them was motivated by a desire to protect union scale
wages and other benefits, and the clauses were not the product of the
union's enforcement of an agreement with large companies to drive the
small companies out of business.'12 The union might lawfully approach the
Secretary of Labor to obtain a minimum wage determination under the
Walsh-Healey Act, except in connection with such a conspiracy.1 2 4 The
lowering of prices for coal by the larger companies in sales to the TVA
was permissible if done defensively and not for the "specific purpose" of
damaging small mines.12 5 Urging the TVA to cut down its purchases of
18Id. at 85552, 85559 (1941) ; id. at 85566, 85569 (1945).
119 Id. at 85571, 85581 (1947).
This rescinding clause was carried over in the
1950 contract. Id. at 85583, 85595 (1964).
Interestingly, the Jewel Tea case did present a collective bargaining agreement
which contained a most favored nation clause. Record, vol. 1, pp. 56-57, Local 189,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965). Mr. Justice
White apparently was not aware of its existence. See id. at 688.
120 Record, vol. 3, p. 1556a, UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
121 Ibid.
M2 Id. at 1557a.
n
2

3

Id. at 1557a-58a.

1 4Id.at 1558a.
12
5 Id. at 1558a-59a.
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spot market coal and increase its purchases by term contract was not a
violation of the antitrust laws unless done for the purpose of driving out
the small operators.'2 6
Other instructions were more general. The court, in posing an eitheror standard, seemed to put forth a "primary objective" test:
The jury must determine from all of the evidence in the case
whether the Union, on the one hand, was acting alone to further
the interest of its members in wages and working conditions. Or,
on the other hand, was acting in combination with the large coal
companies to restrain trade of small companies or to attempt to
27
monopolize the industry for large companies.'
The judge stated that a "specific intent" to restrain trade or build a
monopoly would support a violation where an insubstantial restraint
resulted, 28 but also charged:
It is not necessary to find a specific intent to restrain trade
or to build a monopoly in order to find that the anti-trust laws
have been violated. It is sufficient that a restraint of trade results
as the consequence of the alleged conspirators' conduct or business
arrangements.129
The court also formulated a "sole purpose" test in such a way as to imply
that the union's purpose must have been free from any taint of a desire to
restrain trade:
If you find that the actions of the Union in this case were prompted
solely by the motive to improve the working conditions and wages
of its members, independent of the kind of conspiracy alleged by
Phillips Brothers Coal Company, then you must answer that
there was no conspiracy upon the conspiracy question3 0
The judge allowed the jury to inquire into the "reasonableness" of restraints other than price fixing or market allocation, if first it found
"combination." 131 The instructions closed with a restatement of the Apex
Hosiery and Allen Bradley tests.' 32
After this charge a juryman might reasonably have concluded that he
could find against the union on any one of several theories: that the
union's sole purpose was to shut down or injure the small mine owners;
m Id. at 1587a.
127 Id. at 1549a-50a.

Id. at 1555a.
1554a.
1-o Id. at 1562a.
M

12 Id. at

131 Id. at 1550a.
132 Id. at 1563a.
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that its primary purpose was to do so; that it had a purpose to do so; or
that, irrespective of purpose ("specific intent"), the effect of the collective
bargaining agreements was to close down or injure the small owners.
C. On Remand
It seems doubtful that the Supreme Court opinions made any clearer
the kind or quantum of evidence needed for a finding that a union participated in a conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws.
In Jewel Tea, Mr. Justice White considered only whether the marketing hour clause was within the labor exemption. He said:
It is well at the outset to emphasize that this case comes to us
stripped of any claim of a union-employer conspiracy against
Jewel. The trial court found no evidence to sustain Jewel's conspiracy claim and this finding was not disturbed by the Court of
Appeals.'3
The trial court's finding of no union-employer conspiracy was based partly
on a finding that the members of the multi-employer bargaining group had
bargained at arm's length with the union.'3 The court of appeals had not
"disturbed" the finding of arm's length bargaining, but it had, contrary to
Mr. Justice White's statement, reversed the finding of no union-employer
conspiracy:
In view of the facts in this case as shown by the evidence
it is clear that plaintiff proved that the unions, Associated Food
Retailers and Bromann, its secretary, entered into a combination
or agreement, which constituted a conspiracy, as charged in the
complaint. It was therefore illegal and void because violative of
the Sherman Act ...
The agreement between the unions and Associated Food
Retailers is still operative as shown by their common defense in
this case. Whether it be called an agreement, a contract or a
conspiracy, is immaterial. x35
Would uncontradicted credible evidence of arm's length bargaining negate
a finding of antitrust violation based on an agreement to seek similar terms
from other employers? Mr. Justice White gave no suggestion that such
would be the case. Indeed, in Pennington he said, "there are limits to
what a union or an employer may offer or extract in the name of wages,
and because they must bargain does not mean that the agreement reached
18

381 U.S. at 688.

The trial judge did not give the most favored nation clause any weight in
reaching his decision.
135 Jewel Tea v. Associated Food Retailers, 331 F.2d 547, 551 (7th Cir. 1964).
134
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Were evidence of arm's length bargaining
sufficient to rebut the charge of conspiracy, the only effect of the Pennington
rule might be to encourage unions and employers to build a record of a
hard fight before signing an agreement with a clause whereby the union
agrees to seek similar terms from other employers. It therefore seems
unlikely that Mr. Justice White would consider evidence of arm's length
bargaining relevant to defeating the charge of conspiracy.
The Douglas-Black-Clark opinions did speak to the question of sufficiency of evidence and, indirectly, to the scope of review. In Pennington,
Mr. Justice Douglas said in his concurring opinion that he read Mr. Justice White's opinion as follows:
may disregard other laws." 136

First. On the new trial the jury should be instructed that if
there were an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement
whereby employers and the union agreed on a wage scale that
exceeded the financial ability of some operators to pay and that
if it was made for the purpose of forcing some employers out of
business, the union as well as the employers who participated in
the arrangement with the union should be found to have violated
the antitrust laws.
Second. An industry-wide agreement containing those features is prima facie evidence of a violation.13 7
The second sentence, setting up a prima facie evidence test, appears to do
no more than restate the first. This reading, however, would make the
second sentence absurd. A repetition of all the elements of the first sentence is a violation, not merely a prima facie case. What Mr. Justice
Douglas appears to have meant is that "those features" which constitute
prima facie evidence of violation are: (1) an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement (2) which contains a wage scale beyond the ability of
some employers to pay. Given these facts, Mr. Justice Douglas would
shift to the union the burden of persuading a fact-finder that the agreement
was not made for the purpose of forcing some employers out of business.
This reading is supported by Mr. Justice Douglas' footnote citation to a
8
quotation from Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States:'13
Acceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of
which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman
Act.

.

.

.39

136UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965).

at 672-73.
139 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
139 UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 673 n.*, quoting from Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939).
187Id.
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Thus, Mr. Justice Douglas' view severely undercuts Mr. Justice White's
statement that it is "beyond question" that a union may seek similar
wages from all employers, even where the weak employers cannot afford
the demanded wage. A remaining question is what proof an employer
must present to obtain a finding that the wage scale exceeds his "financial
ability . .

.

to pay."

Mr. Justice Douglas would probably not force the

employer to wait until he had been driven out of business, so presumably
a showing that the employer is currently losing money would suffice.
The Douglas rule carries the rule of Interstate Circuit too far. As the
Supreme Court said in a later case, "circumstantial evidence of consciously
parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial
attitude toward conspiracy; but 'conscious parallelism' has not yet read
conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely." 140 In Interstate Circuit,
two motion picture theater chains and several distributing corporations
were enjoined by a federal district court from enforcing or renewing contracts found to have been entered into in pursuance of a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws. The facts showed that an agent of Interstate,
one of the theater chains, sent a letter to the distributors demanding as a
condition to its continued exhibition of motion pictures in first run theaters
at a night admission of forty cents or more, that the distributors not allow
the same films to be exhibited in any theater at night for less than twentyfive cents, nor allow such films to be part of a double feature. Agents of
the two exhibitors met with representatives of the distributors and subsequently the distributors individually entered into agreements granting the
conditions to the exhibitors. The Supreme Court held that the circumstances justified an inference that the distributors had acted in concert.
This inference was grounded on (1) the failure of the distributors to offer
testimony denying the charges by officials who would have been in a position to know of the existence of an agreement; (2) the "substantial
unanimity of action" taken by the distributors upon the proposals made to
them; and (3) the fact that there were far-reaching changes in the distributors' business methods.1 41
The circumstantial evidence in Interstate Circuit made it more probable than not that the distributors shared a common purpose to offer
benefits to the two powerful theater chains in the form of restraints on
smaller "second run" exhibitors. In the case of a national labor union,
however, the fact that several inefficient producers may be driven out of
business by a high uniform wage scale--or probably more correctly the
fact that a high uniform wage scale is one factor in driving some producers
out of business-does not make it more probable than not that the union
and the more efficient employers have made an agreement designed to put
those producers out of business. It is quite possible that neither the union
140 Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537,
541 (1954).
141 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221, 223 (1939).
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nor the efficient producers would have knowledge that some producers
could not afford to pay the demanded wage. Just as probable would be the
conclusion that the union had unilaterally pressed demands for a uniform
wage to a successful conclusion. Not only would such a course be permissible, but sections 8(d), 8(a) (5) and 8(b) (3) of the Taft-Hartley
Act place a duty on employer and union to bargain in good faith on "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." Does the good
faith requirement demand that the union guarantee employers that they
will not go out of business if they pay the union wage? Such a rule would
put too great a burden on labor unions.
It is evident then that Mr. Justice Douglas has a strong predilection
toward finding an antitrust violation where a collective bargaining agreement injures a signatory employer competitively. His handling of the
issues in Jewel Tea further illustrates this attitude. The collective bargaining agreement itself, he said,
was evidence of a conspiracy among the employers with the
unions to impose the marketing-hours restriction on Jewel via
a strike threat by the unions. This tended to take from the
merchants who agreed among themselves their freedom to work
their own hours and to subject all who, like Jewel, wanted to
sell meat after 6 p.m. to the coercion of threatened strikes, all of
which if done in concert only by businessmen would violate the
antitrust laws. 142
Mr. Justice White, in affirming the trial court finding of a close nexus
between marketing hours and terms of employment, held that the lower
court's finding of underlying fact was not clearly erroneous:
It found that "in stores where meat is sold at night it is impractical to operate without either butchers or other employees. Someone must arrange, replenish and clean the counters and supply
customer services." Operating without butchers would mean
that "their work would be done by others unskilled in the trade,"
and "would involve an increase in workload in preparing for the
night work and cleaning the next morning." 143
Mr. Justice Douglas was more willing to reexamine the underlying facts
as to the impracticality of operating self-service counters without employees on duty:
It is, however, undisputed that on some nights Jewel does so operate in some of its stores in Indiana, and even in Chicago it sometimes operates without butchers at night in the sale of fresh
144
poultry and sausage, which are exempt from the union ban.
142

(1965).

Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 736-37

143 Id. at
144 Id. at

694.
738.
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Mr. Justice Douglas apparently found the increase in workload to be a
consideration not important enough to mention. Perhaps he was right in
doing so, because it is difficult to conceive of the propriety of a union demanding fewer sales as a condition to agreement so that its members
could work less hard. The point to be stressed, however, is that Mr. Justice Douglas was far more willing than Mr. Justice White to reweigh facts
underlying the inferential question of what is a "term or condition of
employment," within the meaning of the section 13 Norris-LaGuardia
exemption. Mr. Justice Douglas apparently held the trial court finding
clearly erroneous because "on some nights" in "some of its stores" Jewel
operated without butchers in Indiana, and "sometimes" so operated in
Chicago "in the sale of poultry and sausage." Contrasted with this willingness to redetermine underlying fact where an antitrust violation was not
found by the trier of fact is his apparent willingness in Pennington to give
the initial trier the power to impute anticompetitive purpose to the union
on evidence of uniform wage agreements which hurt some employers
competitively.14 5
VI. THE GOLDBERG VIEW
Mr. Justice Goldberg's primary disagreement with the other opinions
in Pennington was a product of his fear that a judge or jury might base a
finding of a Sherman Act violation solely on the feeling that a collective
bargaining policy chosen by a union unduly injured some employers.' 46
According to Mr. Justice Goldberg:
Congress intended to foreclose judges and juries from roaming at
large in the area of collective bargaining, under cover of the antitrust laws, by inquiry into the purpose and motive of the employer
47
and union bargaining on mandatory subjects.
At the very least, his position was that union purpose should not be
"inquired into" where mandatory bargaining subjects clearly are involved.
145 Congress can design an oligopoly for our society, if it chooses. But busi-

ness alone cannot do so as long as the antitrust laws are enforced. Nor should

business and labor working hand-in-hand be allowed to make that basic change
in the design of our so-called free enterprise system. If the allegations in this
case are to be believed, organized labor joined hands with organized business
to drive marginal operators out of existence. According to those allegations
the union used its control over West Kentucky Coal Co. and Nashville Coal
Co. to dump coal at such low prices that respondents, who were small operators, had to abandon their business. According to those allegations there
was a boycott by the union and the major companies against the small companies who needed major companies' coal land on which to operate. According
to those allegations, high wage and welfare terms of employment were imposed

on the small, marginal companies by the union and the major companies with
the knowledge and intent that the small ones would be driven out of business.
UMW4 6 v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 674-75 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring).
1 Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 716
(1965).
147 Ibid.
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Yet, in order to decide whether a subject is mandatory or not, where the
subject is not in terms of wages or hours, an analysis of union purpose
must be made. Mr. Justice Goldberg suggested that were the union attempting to protect small independent meat dealers by its marketing hour
restriction, rather than merely limiting the working day at Jewel Tea, the
union still would be immune from antitrust liability. Whether or not he
would hold such an objective a mandatory subject of bargaining, he clearly
is looking at union purpose in order to make a decision about antitrust
immunity. His citation of labor laws as examples of legislative displeasure
at inquiries into union purpose 148 seems misplaced, for Congress has imposed the duty to make such inquiries on the NLRB. 4 The Board made
such an inquiry in a case involving the same protective wage clause that
had been accepted by Phillips in Pennington. In Raymond 0. Lewis,150
the NLRB held that the protective wage clause violated section 8(e) of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,151 on the
ground that the union intended by the clause not to preserve the work and
standards of employment of union employees, 52 but to regulate the terms
and conditions of employment of nonunion companies and to extend the
union contract to them.
Mr. Justice Goldberg's position may be that courts should not be
permitted to infer an agreement with some employers to impose terms on
others from the mere existence of uniform wage contracts within an industry and the fact that some employers have suffered competitively. However, doubt is cast on this reading by Mr. Justice Goldberg's insistence in
Jewel Tea that
even if the self-service markets could operate after 6 p.m., without
their butchers and without increasing the work of their butchers
148Id. at 707-08.
149 Section 8(b) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that the union
commits an unfair labor practice when it threatens, coerces or restrains "any person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case
an object thereof is . . . [to accomplish certain results]." 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1964).
(Emphasis added.)
Section 8(b) (7)
makes picketing an unfair labor practice where "an object' is recognition or orgamzation. 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 8(b) (7) (1964). The extent to which union
purpose is relevant or determinative under § 8(e), 73 Stat 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(e) (1964), which proscribes certain union-employer agreements prohibiting
subcontracting and contracting out of work, is unclear. See generally Lesnick,
Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Redch of NLRA § 8(b)(4) and 8(e),
113 U. PA. L. REv. 1000 (1965). Arguably the result should turn on whether the
union attempts to affect labor standards at the contracting employer's company rather
than at the company of an employer not signatory to the collective bargaining contract.
"Consideration of the purpose of the statutory proscription suggests the view that,
under § 8(e) no less than 8(b) (4), the primary or secondary quality of the union's
action should be tested by examination of its object rather than its effect" Id. at
1032 n.133.
15o 144 N.L.R.B. 228 (1963).
1-5173 Stat 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1964).
152 The Board's reasoning was that the signatory employer was perfectly free
to purchase coal from nonsignatory employers, so long as the nonsignatory employers
.iaintained union standards. Raymond 0. Lewis, 144 N.L.R.B. 228, 236-37 (1963).
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at other times, the result of such operation can reasonably be expected to be either that the small, independent service markets
would have to remain open in order to compete, thus requiring
their union butchers to work at night, or that the small, independent service markets would not be able to operate at night and
thus would be put at a competitive disadvantage. Since it is clear
that the large, automated self-service markets employ fewer butchers per volume of sales than service markets do, the Union certainly has a legitimate interest in keeping service markets competitive so as to preserve jobs. Job security of this kind has been
53
recognized to be a legitimate subject of union interest.1
Must an employer bargain with the union over the job security not
merely of his own employees but of the employees of his competitors? If
so, does an employer also have a duty to bargain with a union about the
price at which he sells his product, on the theory that too low a price will
hurt competitors which have been organized by the same union? Can the
union demand that an employer limit his production to give other unionized employers an opportunity to maintain a given level of sales? Must an
employer bargain over a demand that he deal only with other employers
organized by the same union, in order to preserve jobs for union members? 154 Mr. Justice Goldberg was not willing to carry "job security"
to these limits:
The direct and overriding interest of unions in such subjects as
wages, hours, and other working conditions, which Congress has
recognized in making them subjects of mandatory bargaining, is
clearly lacking where the subject of the agreement is price-fixing
and market allocation. 155
Perhaps a more accurate formulation of Mr. Justice Goldberg's approach is that the labor exemption includes all labor-management agreements except those which are framed in terms of direct market restraintsprice fixing, limitation of production or market allocation.'5 6 Another possible formulation would be that those subjects which are "arguably" mandatory are exempt.:sT This formulation may produce the same results,
153
154

381 U.S. at 727-28.
Such an agreement might constitute an unfair labor practice by both union

and employer and would be void, under § 8(e) of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 543, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1964). This result
was reached as to a clause held to have this purpose in Raymond 0. Lewis, 148
N.L.R.B. 249 (1964), on the ground that all union employers taken collectively did
not constitute an appropriate bargaining unit.

155 381 U.S. at 732-33.
156 This approach was advocated in Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Prelindnary
Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252, 284 n.117 (1955).
157 Cf. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 773 (1959) (union
conduct arguably subject to regulation under federal labor law is exempt from state
regulation).
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because Mr. Justice Goldberg might well say that only direct market restraints are "clearly" nonmandatory.
Under either of the suggested alternative formulations, Mr. Justice
Goldberg's approach gives broader scope to the phrase "terms or conditions
of employment" in the section 13 Norris-LaGuardia labor exemption than
in the duty to bargain imposed by sections 8(d), 8(a) (5) and 8(b) (3) of
Taft-Hartley, because the scope of mandatory bargaining subjects would
not be as wide as the labor exemption. 58 It might be contended that
Congress probably intended similarity of scope where it used similar
phrases. This argument might be countered, however, by pointing out
that Congress has adopted a policy encouraging collective bargaining agreements between labor and management.' 59 By subjecting unions and employers to possible antitrust liability for entering agreements on subjects
neither clearly mandatory nor clearly nonmandatory, areas of unionemployer agreement may become unduly circumscribed, contrary to the
policy of Taft-Hartley.
Some support for this rebutting argument might be found in section 6
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which provides:
No officer or member of any association or organization, and
no association or organization participating or interested in a
labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the
United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in,
or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts
after actual knowledge thereof.160
In United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States,116 the Supreme
Court held that union and employer defendants in a criminal prosecution
under section 1 of the Sherman Act were entitled to a charge under section 6 of Norris-LaGuardia as to ratification of unlawful acts of agents
by the organizations involved: "We hold, therefore, that 'authorization' as
used in § 6 means something different from corporate criminal responsibility for the acts of officers and agents in the course or scope of employment." 162 Section 6 does not, in terms, provide that clear proof must be
shown of the unlawfulness of the acts of "individual officers, members, or
agents," and the Court in Carpenters gave no indication that it does by
implication. The allegations in that case were that the unions had conspired with manufacturers and dealers to monopolize trade in millwork
and patterned lumber in the San Francisco Bay area. The alleged purpose was to prevent out of state manufacturers from selling there. The
15 See notes 4, 6 supra and accompanying text.
'59 Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 1, 61 Stat 136 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964), quoted in part pp. 935-36 infra.
160 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1964).
161330 U.S. 395 (1947).
162d.
at 406. (Footnote omitted.)

LABOR AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS

means to the supposed end was a restrictive collective agreement clause
which provided:
no material will be purchased from, and no work will be done on
any material or article that has had any operation performed on
same by Saw Mills, Mills or Cabinet Shops, or their distributors
that do not conform to the rates of wage and working conditions
of this Agreement.'63
The Court held that a demurrer was properly overruled by the trial court,
and cited Allen Bradley.164
Counsel for the UMW in Pennington argued that section 6 demanded
"clear proof" of union liability. 165 It is arguable that Congress, while
primarily concerned with the agency problem in section 6, evidenced an
intention that the unlawfulness of union purpose not be too easily inferred where the employer-employee relationship is concerned. If there
must be clear proof that the union authorized "unlawful acts," it is entirely
possible that Congress would demand clear proof that a union intended
primarily to restrain trade rather than to seek or protect a wage level.
Mr. Justice White may have adopted a form of the "clear evidence"
rule without elaboration. His statement of the rule in Pennington was
that "a union forfeits its exemption from the antitrust laws when it is
clearly shown that it has agreed with one set of employers to impose a
certain wage scale on other bargaining units." 166
The clear evidence rule would be a way to remedy Mr. Justice Goldberg's mistrust of juries and courts where a union is accused of violating
the antitrust laws. The jury would be charged that the union must clearly
have intended to help some employers at the expense of others, rather than
to get better "terms or conditions of employment" from the contracting
employer. Another way for the Supreme Court to control the free-ranging
power of the lower courts would be to demand specific findings of fact on
evidence which is disputed or attacked as not credible, and to leave the
question of union purpose to restrain trade as a question of law to be decided by the judge. The question of illicit purpose involves a judgment as
to whether union conduct gives rise to an inference that the union was
"conspiring" to restain trade rather than merely "agreeing" on "terms or
conditions of employment" within the section 13 Norris-LaGuardia exemption. That judgment should be made by persons more familiar than a
jury with competing legislative policies which on the one hand encourage
union-employer agreements on working conditions and on the other hand
heavily penalize agreements among employers which unjustifiably restrain
trade. The factors contributing to an inference of unlawful activity should
163 Id. at 399.
16 Id. at 411.
165 Brief for Petitioner, pp. 62-63, UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
166381 U.S. at 665. (Emphasis added.)
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be clearly spelled out in opinion form to provide guidelines for future union
conduct and to facilitate review by appellate courts. The detailed findings
of underlying fact made by the trial judge in Jewel Tea are to be contrasted
with the virtually unreviewable jury finding in Pennington:
The Foreman: . . .
"Did the cross-defendant, U.M.W., engage in a combination
or conspiracy so as to unreasonably restrain trade or monopolize
or attempt to monopolize commerce among the several states outside and beyond the exemption created by the anti-trust statutes
to a labor organization as alleged by cross-plaintiff Phillips
Brothers Coal Company?"
Answer: Yes. 6 7
It might be objected that encouraging the jury to make more specific
findings will have no practical effect. A jury which feels that union policy
was, on balance, censurable because harmful to the employer will simply
answer the questions put to it in such a way as to ensure union liability.
This argument has considerable force, but it is really an argument for what
is probably Mr. justice Goldberg's position: a jury should not be allowed
to speculate as to union purpose unless direct market restraints such as
price fixing clearly are involved.
6
The use of Noerr Motor Freight'1
in Pennington could be cited in
support of this position. The latter case held that union attempts to influence public officials could not be the basis in whole or part, for a finding
of antitrust law violation, irrespective of whether done in "combination"
with employers and for the purpose of restraining trade: "Noerr shields
from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose." 119 Appeals to public officials are not to be
discouraged, but neither are unions and employers to be discouraged from
making agreements about conditions of employment. Therefore a collective bargaining agreement should not be made the basis of an antitrust
violation unless the union clearly had no immediate purpose other than
restraint of trade-as is the case where it overtly attempts to fix prices,
limit production or allocate markets.
167 Record, vol. 3, p. 1588a, UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
168 Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961).
169 381 U.S. at 670.
Mr. Justice White spoke of the "obviously telling nature of this evidence," ibid.,
but left to the trial judge the question of admissibility on the issue of union purpose
as to other transactions. Id. at 670 n.3. If appeals to public officials might be evidence
of illicit purpose as to other acts-seeking high wages from all employers, for example
-the resulting discouragement of such appeals is almost as severe as if antitrust
violations were predicated upon them. It is suggested that Mr. Justice White should
have instructed the trial judge that such evidence was inadmissible for any purpose.
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VII. A

SUGGESTED APPROACH

Mr. Justice White showed the possible unwisdom, from the union's
point of view, of an agreement which restricts the union's future bargaining flexibility, but he did not convincingly demonstrate why such an agreement violates the antitrust laws. He conceded the validity under the Sherman Act of elimination by a union of competition based on differences in
labor standards. 170 Why, then, should the union be penalized by way of
treble damages, perhaps even criminal punishment, for guaranteeing to an
employer that it will maintain a policy of eliminating such competition, in
exchange for a promise of better working conditions? As support for his
conclusion that a promise to impose uniform standards is or may be unlawful under the antitrust laws, Mr. Justice White argued by analogy from
the assumption that it clearly would be unlawful for one group of employers to demand that the union impose higher wages on other employers,
"and if the conspiracy presently under attack were declared exempt it
would hardly be possible to deny exemption to such avowedly discriminatory schemes." 171 The situations, however, are not analogous, and exempting the type of "conspiracy" (agreement) alleged in Pennington would not
force the courts to exempt the other. First, an agreement to impose higher
wages on other employers is not, under the Apex Hosiery test, an agreement to eliminate competition based on differences in labor standards,
but is rather an agreement to encourage or preserve differences in labor
standards. Further, where the union agrees to impose on one set of employers higher wages than the contracting employer promises to pay, it is
apparent that the only immediate purpose the union has in making such
a promise is to disadvantage the other employer. 17 On the other hand, a
clause whereby the union agrees to impose similar standards on other
employers by itself shows no anticompetitive purpose on the union's part,
unless it is certain that other employers cannot meet the standards, so that
the demand for equal standards is effectively a demand to close down.
Except in the latter extreme case, the most probable construction of union
purpose where it agrees to impose similar terms is that the union sees such
a promise as the only practical way to achieve its desired standards in the
face of plausible arguments from employers that they cannot otherwise
afford the raise.
Mr. Justice Goldberg argued that Mr. Justice White's view unduly
elevated form over substance since agreements with multi-employer units
have the same effect as agreements to affect employers outside the bar'1oId.

at 666.
at 668.
17 An exception to this statement might exist where the union expected to get
higher wages from other employers anyway, in which case it did not really give up
anything to the contracting employer and made the "concession" only because the contracting employer was unduly insecure in what it thought the union would do. The
union could avoid the effect of Mr. Justice White's dictum here by getting a collective
bargaining agreement from the high-wage employer first
171 Id.
2
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gaining unit. That is, a union agreement with employer A to impose
similar terms on employers B and C has the same effect as an agreement
on the same terms with employers A, B and C as members of a multiemployer bargaining unit. Yet it must be pointed out that the difference
is not merely formal. In the case of the multi-employer unit, each employer has voluntarily designated its bargaining representative. 17 When
a union agrees with some employers to impose terms on others, however,
the employers outside the original unit have not had an opportunity to
participate in negotiating the terms the union presumably now inflexibly
will demand from them under threat of strike. Thus the proper focus is
on employers outside the original unit which are affected by these kinds
of agreements.
Mr. justice White's seeming concern about the union's sacrifice of
control over its bargaining policy is misplaced if a union is able to use this
sacrifice of freedom to get higher standards of employment. More importantly, this sacrifice by the union is not a sacrifice to allow certain
employers to have complete discretion to formulate union policy; ' 4 it is
a sacrifice made by the union voluntarily, to obtain certain definite terms.
In reality, it seems that Mr. Justice White was primarily concerned with
protecting employers, and this concern is apparent in his opinion:
Prior to the agreement the union might seek uniform standards
in its own self-interest but would be required to assess in each case
the probable costs and gains of a strike or other collective action
to that end and thus might conclude that the objective of uniform
standards should temporarily give way. After the agreement the
union's interest would be bound in each case to that of the favored
175
employer group.
Although it seems clear that a union may be unwise to agree to impose
similar terms on other employers, and that such agreements may hurt those
employers if they are unable to meet the pre-agreed terms, it is questionable
that the antitrust laws are the appropriate means of curtailing these
agreements.
Mr. Justice White demonstrated that an employer's insistence on a
union promise to impose similar terms outside the bargaining unit as a
precondition to agreement would be a failure to bargain in good faith, and
3
7 The position of the NLRB has been:
An employer can withdraw from a multiemployer bargaining unit at will,
1

provided only that the withdrawal request is made before the date set by the
contract for modification, or before the agreed-upon date to begin the multiemployer negotiations, and the withdrawal is unequivocal.
The Evening News Ass'n, 154 N.L.R.B. No. 121, p. 2 (Sept. 24, 1965). (Footnotes
omitted.)
See generally Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R1B. 388 (1958).
174 Cases cited by Mr. Justice White, 381 U.S. at 668-69, did have this vice of
complete sacrifice of control. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) ;
Fashion Originators' Guild of America, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Anderson v. Ship-

owners Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359 (1926).
175 UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 668 (1965).

(Emphasis added.)
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therefore an unfair labor practice.176 Assume, however, that the union
accepted the demand voluntarily, so that no unfair labor practice proceed7
ing was instituted against the employers who demanded such a clause.'
The union might now attempt to impose pre-agreed terms on employers
outside the original group. If these employers rejected the terms, and the
union threatened to strike, it would be appropriate to hold that the union
was not bargaining in good faith and thus was committing an unfair labor
practice.178 Merely acting out the terms of a prior agreement would not
constitute "bargaining."
The General Electric case, 179 decided by the NLRB in 1964, lends
support to the view that a union's demand for terms pursuant to an
agreement with another employer or set of employers is an unfair labor
practice quite apart from Sherman Act considerations. In that case the
employer, General Electric, was held to have violated its duty to bargain
in good faith, in part because it presented an accident insurance proposal
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis:
In practical effect . . . [General Electric's] "bargaining" position is akin to that of a party who enters into negotiations "with a
predetermined resolve not to budge from an initial position," an
attitude inconsistent with good-faith bargaining. 8 0
The Board stated that "our decision rests . . . upon a consideration of
the totality of . . . [General Electric's] conduct," 181 so it is unclear
whether merely coming to the bargaining table with a take-it-or-leave-it
position is itself an unfair labor practice. The Board found that General
Electric went beyond mere stubbornness in adhering to its desired contract goal:
It consciously placed itself in a position where it could not give
unfettered consideration to the merits of any proposals the Union
might offer. Thus, . . . [General Electric] pointed out to the
Union after . . . [General Electric's] communications to the
employees and its "fair and firm offer" to the Union, that "every176 Id. at 666-67.
177 Entering into the agreement itself would not be an unfair labor practice, because the parties to it cannot be said to have refused to bargain with each other. At
any rate, where the parties are in harmony with one another the agreement would
probably not be brought to the attention of the NLRB (prior to union action pursuant
to the agreement).
178 This result is reached under Mr. Justice White's rule anyway, because the
union in this situation would be acting pursuant to an agreement which is probably
illegal on its face.
79 General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 36 (Dec. 16, 1964).
1'0 Id. at 5.

1s1 Id. at 6.
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thing we think we should do is in the proposal and we told our
employees that, and we would look ridiculous if we changed
now." 182
The Board may decide that take-it-or-leave-it bargaining is permissible if
the company or union which pursues such a course has not placed itself in
a position where there is external pressure on it to adhere to its stated
"final" position. Thus the Board may distinguish between a union which
has agreed with some employers to impose terms on others and one which
simply has decided unilaterally to pursue a course of seeking uniform terms
from all employers, just as it may find employer bad faith where the employer publicizes that it will not retreat from its offer to the union but not
find bad faith where the employer simply adheres to a take-it-or-leave-it
offer. The distinction is one of degree, but in the generality of cases the
union making a demand pursuant to an agreement with other employers
has rendered its bargaining policy more inflexible than a union which simply
has made its own policy decision to seek uniform terms, a decision it can
change without breaching an agreement. 8 3 Similarly, an employer which
publicizes to its employees its intention to stand firm on a "final offer" will
be less susceptible to compromise, with concomitant loss of face, than an
employer which has not publicized its intentions.'8
82

Id. at 5.
See NLRB v. Superior Fireproof Door & Sash Co., 289 F.2d 713 (2d Cir.
1961), where the union made an agreement with employer A with a proviso that
no other Employer . . .shall be accorded terms and conditions in a collective
bargaining agreement which are more favorable than those contained herein;
including classifications and minimum rates of pay. The foregoing however,
shall not apply to general wage increases and rates of pay.
Id. at 715. The court rejected the contention by employer B, which had been held
by the NLRB to have violated its duty to bargain in good faith with the union, that
the clause prevented the union from bargaining in good faith, and thus absolved it
of any duty toward the union. The evidence showed that the union had entertained
proposals by employer B for terms different from those in employer A's agreement
and that the union had agreed on more favorable terms with other employers. The
court said, however:
Nevertheless it does not follow from our rejection of this contention that the
1

183

impact of the . . . [employer A] contract should be wholly disregarded.

A

union that has thus limited its freedom at the bargaining table can hardly
expect that this will not have an effect upon the conduct of the employer;
and the course of the negotiations here must be viewed in that light.
Id. at 718.
184 The Board might also find an unfair labor practice in a union's rigid insistence
on terms the employer clearly cannot afford, on the theory that since the union cannot

reasonably expect the employer to accept such terms, it has evidenced an intention
not to reach an agreement. See NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953), where the employer submitted a brief
proposal with a working hours provision from an old contract, but with no provision
on wages, grievance procedure or other matters proposed by the union. The court said:
It is difficult to believe that the Company with a straight face and in good
faith could have supposed that this proposal had the slightest chance of acceptance by a self-respecting union, or even that it might advance the negotiations by affording a basis of discussion; rather, it looks more like a stalling
tactic by a party bent upon maintaining the pretense of bargaining.
Id. at 139. In unclear cases, where the employer realistically is capable of producing
more efficiently and thus might be able to meet the terms, the union should not be
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The product of this approach would be, in practice, that unions would
not make agreements to impose terms of employment on other employers
because they would commit an unfair labor practice by attempting to carry
them out in the face of employer resistance. The difference between the
unfair labor practice approach and the antitrust violation approach is that
under the former the union would be subject to a cease and desist order, 8 5
instead of treble damages 186 or penal sanction, 8 7 if it were found to have
carried out such an agreement, and the finding as to whether such an
agreement existed would be made in the first instance by the NLRB.
It is submitted that, except in extreme cases such as Allen Bradley
where the union clearly agrees to impose on other employers terms relating directly to the product market, such as price fixing, product limitation
or market allocation, the labor law approach is preferable to the antitrust
approach for several reasons. First, the good faith bargaining approach
forces the employer to complain about the union's conduct before it has
been injured, rather than first to make an agreement and then seek redress
by bringing suit against the union as a quasi-insurer. If an employer thinks
the union's inflexible demand for a high wage is the product of an agreement with another employer or other employers to impose uniform wages
outside the bargaining unit, it seems reasonable to expect that employer to
bring its case before the NLRB and complain that the union is violating its
duty to bargain in good faith.
Second, Congress has placed a duty on union and employer to bargain in good faith on mandatory bargaining subjects, which are those areas
most directly related to wages, hours and working conditions. 88 The
legislative policy stated in the Taft-Hartley Act encourges peaceful agreement between labor and management:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow
of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when
they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
held to have acted in bad faith simply by insisting on those terms. Otherwise the
Board would come dangerously close to prescribing what substantive terms of employment are reasonable for a given company. The "straight face' test does not conflict
with Mr. Justice White's statement that the union may demand a high uniform wage
from all employers even though it may "suspect" that some "cannot effectively com-

pete" if they agree. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 n.2 (1965).

Mr. Justice

White's statement is distinguishable because he was talking about suspicion rather
than certainty, and because he was speaking about antitrust law and exemptions from
it rather than unfair labor practices.
185 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(c), 61 Stat. 147

(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
§4, 38 Stat 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
§§ 1, 2, 26 Stat 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
188 See the approach taken in Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283,
186 Clayton Act
1 7

S Sherman Act

293-95 (1960).
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representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection."'
Where there is no express union-employer agreement it may be impossible
to distinguish between situations in which the union is unilaterally carrying
out its own policy, and those in which it is acting pursuant to a tacit or oral
agreement. If a judge or jury is permitted to infer an agreement to impose terms from the fact of uniform agreements prevailing in the industry
and the business failure of a number of employers, 190 the line between
activity the union is encouraged to engage in and that which it is prohibited
from engaging in may become quite blurred. Treble damages or criminal
punishment seems too harsh a punishment to inflict on a union whose only
mistake may have been to adopt a vigorous uniform wage policy, causing
some employers to go out of business.19 '
Third, because of its experience in the labor area, the NLRB may be
expected to be more competent than a court or jury at divining whether a
union is acting pursuant to an agreement or pursuant to its unilaterally
adopted wage policy. NLRB familiarity with the bargaining history of
the union involved may be valuable. Further, a jury chosen from the
locality in which employers went out of business may be biased against the
union to the point of being too ready to infer the kind of union-employer
agreement Mr. Justice White places outside the union exemption. Where
evidence of great union economic power has been introduced, 1 2 a jury
may hold the union liable as a better risk bearer.
Fourth, unless current jury practice is changed, fact finding by the
NLRB would have the added advantage of providing a reviewing court with
a written finding of facts with supporting reasons, rather than an unexplained jury finding that the union did violate the antitrust laws. 9 3
Even though the NLRB has made a final determination that a union
has agreed with some employers to impose terms of employment on others,
this finding should not provide the basis for an antitrust suit, because
the employer should not be encouraged to delay bringing his action and
thus increase his damages, and because treble damages would still be too
harsh a consequence to follow a finding that a union has crossed the delicate
line between encouraged and prohibited conduct.
189 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 1, 61 Stat 137 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
190 This may be what happened in the Pennington case. See notes 73-132 supra
and accompanying text.
191 Indeed, Mr. Justice White specifically stated that this activity would not itself
constitute
a violation. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 n.2 (1965).
92
See notes 86-94 supra and accompanying text. The UMW had invested
$9,067,984.62 in the stock of a Washington, D.C., bank and held other shares as collateral on a $12,428,241.99 loan. Record, vol. 1, p. 500a, UMW v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657 (1965). Phillips cited this financial interest simply as an example of the
union's economic power. Id. at vol. 2, p. 632a.
193 See the jury finding in Pennington, note 167 supra and accompanying text.
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The practical effect of this approach would be that a complaint alleging a union-employer agreement in which the union has promised to impose
terms other than direct market restraints would be dismissed by the
court. An allegation that the union has agreed to impose direct market
restraints on other employers, or has agreed to enforce the terms of an
agreement which creates direct market restraints among employers party
to it, should not be dismissed. Since in cases where the evidence is circumstantial it will be difficult to distinguish agreements to impose terms other
than direct market restraints from agreements to impose direct market restraints, the clear evidence rule should be retained where direct restraints
are alleged.
VIII. UNION CONTROL OF EmPLOYERS

In Pennington the evidence was uncontradicted that the union had acquired a substantial amount of stock in one of the large coal producers.
There was conflicting evidence as to union purpose in acquiring this stock
and the use made of it. The UMW testimony was that its intention was
merely to make an investment and to expand employment opportunities
for union members.'9
Phillips claimed the union had used the mining
company to drive prices down in the TVA spot market in order to hurt
small mines.' 9 5 Mr. Justice Goldberg criticized the court of appeals for
"in effect holding that the ownership of a controlling or substantial interest in a company which violates the antitrust laws subjects the owner of
that interest to personal antitrust liability."' 19 6 To attribute the alleged
price cutting to the UMW, Mr. Justice Goldberg contended, "the owner
must be shown to have participated knowingly and actively in the alleged
illegal activity." 197 While this view is justified with respect to the ordinary
shareholder, a different rule might be proposed in the case of labor unions.
In the present case it was uncontested that several small unionized companies had been forced to close down. This additional evidence may warrant an inference of destructive purpose behind seeking high wages from
less efficient producers. Were Mr. Justice Goldberg's approach adopted,
the Supreme Court might justifiably fashion an exception that unions
forego their exemption from antitrust liability and subject their actions to
the rule of reason when they become too closely identified with an employer or employers.' g8 However, close identification of a union with an
employer lends itself to abuses quite without the scope of the antitrust
laws. It is suggested that these potential abuses call for additional legislation.
194 Record, vol. 3, pp. 1124a-27a, UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657

(1965).

19 5Id. at vol. 2, pp. 609a-611a.

198 Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 734

(1965).
'97 Ibid.

198 A justifiable reason for union control of the employer might be that the copinpany would go out of business without new capital, and only the union was willing
to make the investment in order to preserve jobs.
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John L. Lewis testified in Pennington that UMW control of West
Kentucky was not a conflict of interest, 19 9 but surely such a conflict might
arise in a given case. Union officials might decide to benefit the general
coffers of the union via corporate profits rather than to seek high wages. In
the case of a union-controlled company which the union then attempts to
organize, the employees have a right to make an informed choice on whether
they want to belong to the union. Officials of a union-controlled company
probably will not be as diligent in informing employees of the possible detrimental aspects of unionization as they would in a company not unioncontrolled. In this case, the evidence was that the remaining shareholders
of West Kentucky were not made aware of the large union interest in the
company2 0° Fairness to other shareholders demands that they be fully
informed that the management might be oriented toward giving employees
high wages rather than fighting union demands.
Much of the concern expressed so far could be remedied by requiring
full disclosure of substantial direct or indirect union investments in companies, including disguised investments whereby stock is taken as security
for loans, to shareholders of the companies and to union members. It is
arguable, however, that Congress would want unions to have the bargaining power of employee representation, but not of employer control. Therefore, Congress might want to prevent union control of companies it has
organized, or even union control of any substantial interest in them. It
might also want to prevent a union from organizing a company in which
it has made a substantial investment.
-99 Record, vol. 3, p. 1127a, UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
2 00
Id. at vol. 2, pp. 591a-93a.

